The Commission has spent two decades telling contract agents that their situation is transitional. In a decade the category has doubled, on the review’s own figures, and become structural, and the institution has built a dependency it could not now do without. What happens to it is being decided now. On 26 October the High-Level reflection group on the future of the Commission’s civil service published its final report, the outside-in companion to the large-scale review: fifteen internal workstreams delivered ninety-six recommendations in July, the staff consultation closed on 30 September, and Commissioner Serafin is expected to present the final report to the College by the end of the year.

The review is an opportunity because it says out loud several things that were previously left unsaid: that non-permanent staff are an intrinsic part of the workforce, that turnover costs the institution, that internal competitions are under-used as a stabilisation tool, and that careers should reward experience independently of status. What neither document says is what happens to those people. The decisions that follow run to the end of the decade, and which reading prevails should be settled in social dialogue before any decision is taken, not explained afterwards. AACIE took part in the consultation, in its own name and through its members, and will transmit a fuller position separately; we will keep pressing on this, in social dialogue and wherever else the decisions are taken. This article sets out what is actually at stake, who benefits from the present arrangement, who pays for it, and who will pay if the final report is read the wrong way.

What is actually being decided

The Large-Scale Review sets out to redesign the Commission’s workforce model for the next decade. The decisions that would follow from it are already visible: the transformation of executive agencies, the creation of new Offices, and the redeployment of a substantial share of staff by the end of 2029.

Contract agents appear in the review’s material unevenly, mostly as CA3b and rarely as CA3a, although on the review’s own figures contract and temporary agents together are 36.2 % of the Commission’s workforce, of whom contract agents alone are 25.8 %. The reflection group’s report confirms the diagnosis in a single sentence: non-permanent staff now make up over one-third of the workforce, but face unclear pathways, because the career system was not designed with this category of staff in mind. A quarter of the workforce is still being planned for in the margins of a document about everyone else.

What the arrangement costs, and who counts it

The system we know today is the accumulation of decisions taken mainly with cost and the scarcity of establishment posts in mind, with the consequence that core functions of the institution are performed by a growing number of colleagues on precarious, fixed-term contracts.

A contract agent is paid on a separate salary scale under Article 93 of the CEOS, not on the scale that applies to officials and temporary agents, and does not consume a post in the establishment plan, which is the scarce resource a directorate-general actually fights over. A service that needs capacity and has no post can obtain it quickly, at a lower cost, without asking anyone for a post.

What the arrangement costs is never counted. At six years the colleague leaves. The knowledge of the file goes with them. A successor is recruited and trained by colleagues whose time is not accounted for. The counterparts in Member States, in delegations, among contractors and beneficiaries start again with someone new. The errors that experience would have prevented are made again, and they are booked as operational problems rather than as the cost of a staffing choice. The review itself says that turnover and poor career prospects damage business continuity and institutional memory. It simply does not attach a figure to it, because the institution has never taken the time to quantify it.

Precarity is not only a problem for the precarious

It would be easy to read all this as a contract-agent grievance. It is not, and colleagues who are not contract agents have a direct interest in how it is resolved.

Continuity is carried by whoever stays. In a unit where part of the team turns over every few years by design, the handovers, the rebuilt files and the corporate memory fall on the colleagues who have been there longer. Bringing a newcomer up to speed on the work itself is nobody’s assigned task: the mentoring is done by whoever is available, often by a colleague who arrived only slightly earlier, and sometimes by no one at all. At the other end, the closing months of a fixed-term contract go into transferring files to a successor who will, in a few years, transfer them again, so part of every contract is spent preparing for its own end. None of that work is recognised or counted, and with every departure that had nothing to do with performance, a little more of the institution’s memory goes with it.

An institution cannot attract what it will not keep

The review’s stated objective is to attract and retain the best people. Precarity is the largest single obstacle to that objective, and it operates before anyone applies.

A specialist with fifteen years in a field and options elsewhere does not accept a six-year ceiling on a lower salary scale with no career structure attached. So the institution does not get those profiles, or gets them briefly. What it does attract are people early in their careers, people attached to the mission, and people without alternatives. It trains them, appraises them, and loses them at the point where they have become most useful. Over time this selects a workforce for tolerance of insecurity rather than for expertise. No amount of improvement in recruitment procedure corrects it, because the problem is not how people are selected but what they are being offered.

The same logic runs through the proposed new entry model, in which the experience already acquired inside the institution would not be recognised and Commission service would count only as if it had been acquired outside. Re-testing colleagues the institution has employed and appraised for a decade implies a lack of confidence in the institution’s own supervisory and appraisal functions, which no recruitment policy can correct.

The same words can produce opposite outcomes

Two documents now describe the future workforce in nearly the same vocabulary, and neither settles what it means. The workstreams propose to progressively reduce reliance on non-permanent staff in core non-specialist functions, while preserving continuity. The reflection group recommends “transparent career pathways for a hybrid workforce, balancing permanent talent and temporary expertise”, and that recruitment should clearly distinguish between the permanent pathway and fixed-term contracts. Each of these passages can be implemented in ways that are the exact opposite of one another.

The first is the reduction itself. It does not say by what means. The people already doing the work can be stabilised. The same functions can be filled by establishment-plan staff instead, and the incumbents let go. The functions can be discontinued. Or they can be moved outside the establishment altogether through externalisation or automation, which other workstreams separately propose. All four reduce the number. Only the first preserves continuity for the people concerned, and that difference is the whole of the question: what becomes of the people now doing the work, and on what terms they move into the new system.

The second is the hybrid workforce. Transparent pathways for a hybrid workforce can give experience somewhere to go: a protected bridge from contract to permanent status, assessed on the record the institution already holds. Or the same words can legitimise the ceiling, by making a permanent core and a revolving periphery an official design principle, with pathways transparent in the sense that everyone can see there is no way through.

The third is the treatment of colleagues already in service when the new system starts. The reflection group is silent on the six-year CA3b ceiling, and on whether serving staff, on whom the institution holds years of verified performance data, would be asked to start again from zero under the new entry model. A transition can be a genuine bridge, or a re-run of everything already proven, followed by the closure of the internal routes.

There is also new machinery to watch. The report proposes an annual central pool of posts taken back from the DGs, and a review of how all posts will be affected by AI, with redeployment and reskilling as consequences. That machinery is designed around establishment posts. A contract agent’s ability to follow a function depends on contract type, budget source, DG and place of employment. Without contract-staff safeguards written into both exercises, the pool will move officials, and the inventory will redesign work around the people the institution intends to keep.

What a good outcome would look like

While not everyone can become an official, a simpler principle should govern the transition: the employment relationship should follow the nature, duration and level of responsibility of the work. Where a function recurs, the contract that covers it should reflect that. Where a function is genuinely temporary, a fixed term is legitimate. This is not a standard we are inventing for the occasion. It is the one the Commission enforces on the Member States: in May 2026 it obtained a declaration from the Court of Justice, in Case C-155/25 under Article 258 TFEU, that Italy had failed to introduce adequate measures against the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts for administrative and technical staff in state education.

From that principle a short list follows, and none of it is radical.

Say which route is intended for reducing reliance on non-permanent staff, and make the employment consequences explicit before implementation. Build a real in-service route to established status, assessed on the record the institution already holds rather than on a test taken again from the beginning. Use the routes that already exist: the 2017 implementing provisions provide, in Articles 13 and 14, for function-group advancement and for moving a CA3b onto a CA3a contract, but they make both exceptional, funds-dependent and discretionary. Open a path from an indefinite contract-agent post to a temporary-agent post of indefinite duration, as the review already contemplates for the executive agencies, so that colleagues who have reached the top grade of their function group are not simply left there. Extend the proposed mobility framework to the Offices, which it currently omits and where contract staff are most concentrated. Attach staff-continuity guarantees to the Office and agency reforms, published before any decision is taken, not after. Write contract-staff safeguards into the annual post pool and the AI work-redesign review. Require a written and individualised explanation for every non-renewal. Give experience somewhere to go in every contractual category: career progression has to mean duties, function group and grade together. And report on all of it, by status, in the annual report the Commission already owes under Article 79(3) of the CEOS, so that next time the conversation starts from evidence rather than from impressions.

Have your say

One thing this file lacks on every side is evidence. Nobody, including the review, has reliable figures on what actually happens to contract staff: how often a post continues after a contract ends, how long reclassification takes, how many colleagues leave at the ceiling and what they were doing. AACIE asked its members for exactly these cases in September, and will keep collecting them, anonymously or in aggregate: a non-renewal where the job continued, duties well above the formal level, a status change that cost grade or pay, a competition you were not allowed to sit. If you have one, write to us at info@aacie.eu. If you share these concerns, consider becoming a member of AACIE.

Luca Palazzotto
President, AACIE